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Abstract 
This paper assesses the aid-development nexus in 52 African countries using updated 
data (1996-2010) and a new indicator of human development (adjusted for inequality). The 
effects of Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) and NODA from Multilateral donors on economic prosperity (at 
national and per capita levels) are also examined. The findings broadly indicate that development 
assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per capita growth and inequality adjusted human 
development. The magnitude of negativity (which is consistent across specifications and 
development dynamics) is highest for NODA from Multilateral donors, followed by NODA from 
DAC countries. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the relevance of these results 
point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in Africa. Though the stated 
intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It 
is a momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and 
policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the 
meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for 
piecemeal results. Policy implications and caveats are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Foreign aid has been motivated by a mixture of economic interests, altruism, historical 
ties and geo-strategic (imperialist) considerations
1
. Donors, mostly from the Western capitalist 
world have offered foreign aid to developing countries in the form of grants and soft loans, 
                         
1
 The imperialist origin of poverty is still widely debated. See Alam (2004).  
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especially after the emergence of dozens of states with the decolonization process (Oya, 2006). 
While foreign aid may be necessary in the short-term due to certain humanitarian concerns, there 
has been an endless debate over the effectiveness of aid to Africa and the linkage between aid, 
conditionality and economic policies in recipient countries
2
. This debate has led many analysts to 
question the usefulness of aid and the need for alternatives (Oya, 2006)
3
. It has been substantially 
documented that the Cold war and the battle for geopolitical control in Africa between 
superpowers was perhaps the most important determinant of aid increases in the 1980s 
(Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).  
 Over five decades since the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs were 
instituted, the concern over the effectiveness of foreign aid remains widely debated and 
unsolved. In 2005 the West tried hardest to save Africa. In July of that year, the Group of Eight 
(G8) agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion to finance the 
‘Big push’, as well as cancel African aid-loans contracted during previous attempts at a ‘Big 
push’. Before this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region in the world. In 
September of that same year, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to further discuss 
progress on ending poverty in the continent. To point out some frustrating statistics, sub-Saharan 
Africa contains 11% of the world’s population, but produces only 1% of the world’s GDP 
(Easterly, 2005a). In the median African nation, 43% of the population lives on less than one 
dollar a day. On the World Food Program list, of the 23 countries with more than 35% of the 
                         
2
 This debate on conditionality has recently intensified when the British and the U.S governments threatened to cut-
off aid to African nations because of the prosecution of homosexuals in recipient countries. Many African 
government officials and activists have seen the threat as an insult to both African values and moral wellbeing. 
3
 The debate extends to areas of external assistance like structural adjustment policies by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  There is substantially documented evidence that the IMF’s neoliberal policies have been perilous to 
South Korean development after the 1997 crisis (Crotty & Lee, 2002, 2006, 2009) and the main cause of the 
Argentinean crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Levy & Duménil, 2006). Even recent findings from Africa 
suggest that the IMF’s structural adjustment policies may not have the investment effects in the future (Asongu, 
2013a).  
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population malnourished, 17 are in Africa. The long and brutal civil wars in Angola, Chad, 
Somalia, Sierra Leon, Liberia…etc, not to mention Rwanda’s genocide and recent carnages in 
Darfur-Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (registering the world’s highest war 
casualties since World War II). In fact, seven of the eight recent cases of total societal 
breakdown into anarchy in the world known to literature have been in Africa: Angola, Burundi, 
Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zaire/Congo (beside Afghanistan). 
Much of the literature has focused on the macroeconomic impact of aid, but mixed results 
have been reported and those that have revealed significant positive effects face heavy 
methodological criticisms. In assessing the impact of development assistance, a great chunk of 
studies focus on the effect of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables 
(investment or public consumption). The underlying assumption here is the notion that aid is 
destined to bridge the saving-investment gap poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & 
Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005a). Surprisingly there has been much less research conducted on the 
impact of foreign aid on the evolution of human development (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005), in 
spite of the change in objectives announced by the donor community  which have evolved from 
intensive industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more recent poverty-reducing 
objectives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With the year 2015 drawing 
nigh, it is imperative to assess the donors’ objective of reaching the MDGs. In plainer terms, 
investigating the effectiveness of development assistance on human development in developing 
countries in the run-up to 2015 could provide crucial policy options to donor and multilateral 
agencies on their assistance impact. 
 The contribution of this paper to the literature is sixfold. Firstly, we cut adrift existing 
literature and assess the aid-development nexus from three dimensions (GDP growth, GDP per 
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capita growth and human development). Another important contribution worth pointing out is 
the use of a hitherto human development measure unemployed in the literature: the Inequality 
Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) first published in the 2010 Human Development 
Report
4
. Secondly, a great bulk of the literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 
1995. By using recent data (1996-2010), this paper provides an updated account of trends in the 
nexuses. Also, results from recent data will enable a more robust projection of the MDGs
5
. 
Thirdly; the global economic downturn has sparked concerns about donor’s continued 
willingness to give (Ahmed et al., 2011). Hence, assessing the development effects of foreign aid 
in the most aid-intensive continent could throw more light into the debate
6
.  Fourthly, there is 
currently a shifting of policy space to aid alternatives from East Asia. Learning from the East 
Asian success stories has been hampered by an unequal bargaining power of African 
governments, vis-à-vis Western development partners. For example, the Chinese ‘cooperative 
and non-interference’ oriented aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) policy in Africa is viewed 
by some as a better alternative. Thus, the outcome of this study may either reinforce the growing 
mentality or negate it. Fifthly, this paper broadly extends the Okada & Samreth (2012) and 
Asongu (2012a, 2013b) debate ‘on the effect of foreign-aid on corruption’ from an institutional 
                         
4
As suggested by Boone (1996), aid effectiveness should not only be measured by its impact on GDP growth. 
Therefore, our analysis can both capture GDP and human development targeted development assistance. Moreover, 
while past research on the aid-development nexus has used the HDI unadjusted for inequality, this paper is to the 
best of our knowledge the first that uses the IHDI in the aid-development assessment. 
5
 A great chunk of the literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 1995. By using recent data (1996-
2010), this paper provides an updated account of the nexus. 
6
 Koechlin (2007) has recently reframed the debate by assessing three ambitious books (Sachs's The End of Poverty, 
Bhagwati's In Defense of Globalization, and Easterly's The Elusive Quest for Growth), and has concluded that, the 
insights and shortcomings of these three books remind us that the status quo is not working and that a rich 
understanding of globalization and development requires a serious consideration of alternative visions of each. 
Some new ways of theorizing development in  light of the globalized systems of food production have included the 
USA led ‘genetically modified food aid’ to the Southern African region, which is widely criticized by the European 
Union (Herrick, 2008).  
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to an economic perspective
7
. Sixthly; our focus on 52 of the 54 countries in Africa provides a 
broad view on the continent in which the aid-development debate is most intense
8
.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 presents the 
literature on aid effectiveness. Data and methodology are presented and described respectively in 
Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical highlights, conflicts in the literature, Africa’s need and Western responses   
 
2.1 Theoretical highlights and conflicts in the literature  
  
The concern of whether aid improves GDP growth can be traced back to the two-gap 
model (Chenery & Strout, 1966), which remains the most influential theoretical underpinning of 
the aid effectiveness literature. In this model, developing countries face constraints on savings 
and export earnings that deter investment and economic growth. In spite of the severe criticisms  
since its inception, this model has provided the underlying principles both for early  aid policies 
(Easterly, 1999) and regression specifications of a great many aid-growth (savings) empirical 
papers (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005).  
The literature on the effectiveness of aid has almost exclusively been focused on the 
macroeconomic impacts of aid, assessing the effects of aid on economic savings, investment and 
growth. The lack of analytical framework, heavy reliance on empirical evidence (which is often 
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 “The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) finding that aid deters corruption could have an important influence on policy  
and academic debates. This paper partially negates their criticism of the mainstream approach to the 
aiddevelopment nexus. Using updated data (1996-2010) from 52 African countries, we provide robust evidence of a  
positive aid-corruption nexus. Development assistance fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) in the  
African continent. As a policy implication, the Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) finding for developing countries may  
not be relevant for Africa” (Asongu, 2012a, p. 1). In response to some informal discussions that have emerged citing 
that the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a) findings are not directly comparable because of differences in 
methodological underpinnings, Asongu (2013b) has confirmed his stance on the debate by using the Okada & 
Samreth methodology and extending the grounds of his position from corruption to eight institutional quality 
dynamics.  
8
 We focus mainly on Africa where the aid-development debate is most tensed. While previous studies have mixed 
countries in various continental regions or focused on a restricted set of countries owing to constraints in data 
availability, this paper uses data from 52 of the 54 African countries.  
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ambiguous at best) and inconclusive  results with recently refined methodologies (Masud & 
Yontcheva, 2005), have left the subject matter widely open to debate. For the purpose of clarity, 
literature pertaining to the effectiveness of aid on growth (development) could be clubbed into 
two strands as summarized in Table 1: one advocating the negative consequences of aid and the 
other acknowledging the positive rewards of development assistance.  
The first strand entails authors presenting the case for the insignificant impact of aid on 
investment, savings or growth. Aid has been shown to breed unproductive public consumption 
(Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing investment. This latter point has been supported by 
Boone (1996) and Reichel (1995). Ghura (1995) has pointed to the negative effect of aid on 
domestic savings while Pedersen (1996) asserts, foreign aid distorts development and leads to 
aid dependency. Very recent African aid-development literature has established that aid fuels 
corruption (Asongu, 2012a), a negative nexus that has been extended to other government 
quality dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice & 
accountability and regulation quality (Asongu, 2012b; Asongu, 2013b).  
 In the second strand, we find studies favoring positive effects of aid on growth and 
development. Among these works, we shall highlight that of   Burnside & Dollar (2000) which 
concludes that aid can be effective when economic (monetary, fiscal and trade) policies are 
good. The Burnside & Dollar (2000) work has received abundant comments from researchers 
(Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Colier & Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003), whose results have 
been challenged as being “extremely data dependent” (Clemens et al., 2004). While Clemens et 
al., (2004) have shown that aid is beneficial in the short-term; Minou & Reddy (2010) have 
recently established that the beneficial effects could also be in the long-run. Gomanee et al. 
(2003) have concluded that aid has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect impact through 
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public spending and social services. The indirect perspective has been confirmed by Mosley et 
al. (2004) on poverty and wellbeing in recipient countries. 
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature 
 Researchers Main findings  
  
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth (development) 
 
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid increases unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth. 
  
Reichel (1995) Aid fails to promote savings owing to the substitution effect. 
  
Ghura (1995) Aid negatively impacts savings. 
  
Boone (1996)  Aid is insignificant in improving economic development for two reasons: 
poverty is not caused by capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to 
adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows. 
  
Pedersen (1996) Foreign Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency. 
  
Asongu (2012a)  Foreign aid fuels corruption and mitigates the control of corruption  
  
Asongu (2012b)  Development assistance is perilous to government quality dynamics  
  
Asongu (2013b) Foreign aid is detrimental to institutional quality irrespective of initial levels in 
institutional development.  
 
Second-strand : Aid improves growth (development) 
 
Ghura (1995) Aids positively impacts savings for good adjusters.  
  
Burnside & Dollar (2000) Aid can be effective when policies and economic management are good. 
  
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors (shocks and hazards). 
  
Collier & Dehn (2001) Aid effectiveness depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 
on negative supply shocks is better than targeting based on good policies.  
  
Collier & Dollar (2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per capita 
income growth and the impact of per capita income growth on poverty 
reduction. 
  
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly 
in line with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human 
wellbeing.  
  
Gomanee et al. (2003) Aid has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect effect through public 
spending on social services.  
  
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive impact on growth. 
  
Ishfaq (2004) Foreign aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the extent of 
poverty in Pakistan. 
  
Mosley et al. (2004) Foreign assistance has an indirect impact on poverty and the wellbeing of 
recipient countries. 
  
Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works to mitigate poverty, and poverty would be higher in the 
absence of aid. 
  
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes.  
  
Minou & Reddy (2010) Development assistance positively affects growth in the long-term. 
  
Okada & Samreth (2012)  Foreign aid reduces corruption.  
  
Source (Author) 
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While the effectiveness of aid is more straightforward for some (Ishfaq, 2004; Addison et 
al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006), the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings ‘on the effect of foreign 
aid on corruption’ have recently been object of intense debate from an African perspective 
(Asongu, 2012a; Asongu, 2013b). Addison et al. (2005) have concluded that aid strengthens pro-
poor public expenditure and has a positive impact on growth because it broadly mitigates 
poverty. Their position that poverty will be higher in the absence of aid has been confirmed by 
Ishfaq (2004). Of all examined proponents of a positive aid-development nexus, Fielding et al. 
(2006) have been the most optimistic in their conclusion on a straight forward positive impact of 
aid on development outcomes.  
 
2. 2 Africa’s need and Western responses  
 
The bulk of African countries lie low on standard international comparisons. In line with 
Easterly (2005a), they occupy most of the bottom places in income per capita, percent of 
population living in extreme poverty (less than one US dollar a day), life expectancy, infant 
mortality, literacy, AIDS prevalence and the HDI. The last four decades have been those of some 
growth disappointment in Africa. The West has responded to Africa’s tragedy with intensive 
involvement of foreign aid agencies and international organizations. On average, African 
countries receive much more aid as a percentage of their GDPs than other developing countries. 
The West does more because Africa is poor, however its efforts are supposed to have a positive 
impact on the GDPs of recipient countries. 
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Figure 1: Foreign aid to Africa/World 
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Source (World Bank) 
 As illustrated in Figure 1 above, Africa has received more aid in terms of GDP relative to 
World aid in terms of Gross National Income. The sharp drop in aid from the 1990s marks the 
end of the Cold war with the fall of the Berlin wall. This confirms the thesis that one of the prime 
motivations for development assistance was imperialism and the quest for geo-political 
influence. Accordingly, among donors most engaged in the Cold war struggle (particularly the 
United States and the Soviet Union) domestic support for aid evaporated with the end of the 
global ideological clash. Consistent with Hopkins (2000), among  the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation (OECD) members, the largest declines in aid since 1992 are reported in the United 
States, followed by close military allies: Germany, Japan, Australia…etc. According to the 
author, the decline in aid from 1992 to 1998 from each of the OECD countries corresponds fairly 
well to a rank ordering countries in terms of the intensity of their involvement in cold war 
activities. However, the erosion of cold war motivations did not affect all donors. Nonaligned 
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states like Finland and Switzerland which did not use aid for strategic purposes avoided 
substantial declines in the 1990s.  
 After the year 2000, with the adoption of the MDGs, foreign aid soared in Africa and 
only declined again in the wake of the global financial crisis when donors’ commitment reduced 
owing to budget austerity measures. From the first graph in Figure 1, it could also be noticed that 
while aid to Africa varied with the above discussed factors, World aid remained relatively stable. 
Even if World aid varied as shown in the second graph, the variations are marginal compared to 
those of African aid because the units of their corresponding y axes are not directly comparable.  
 Consistent with Easterly (2005a), theories and empirics on Western assistance to Africa 
can be discussed in five main strands: the Big-Push models and foreign aid; project interventions 
in terms of education and health; policies and growth models; aid, institutions and development; 
dysfunctional donors and; the shift in focus of aid from development to poverty alleviation.  
 In the first strand, ‘Big-Push’ models suggest that Africa is poor because it is stuck in a 
“poverty trap”. To emerge from the poverty trap, it needs a large aid-financed increase in 
investment: a ‘Big Push’. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have been used 
to discuss the mechanisms of circumstances surrounding the poverty trap. The first mechanism 
suggests that savings are quite low for people who are very close to subsistence (as would be 
predicted by a Stone-Geary utility function). In a closed economy saving equals investment and 
therefore investment is low. In the Harrod-Domar model with the capital constraint binding, 
growth of GDP per capita is simply a linear function of the investment (=saving) rate minus the 
population and depreciation rates. If the saving is quite low to compensate for population growth 
and the depreciation of per capita, per capita growth will be zero or negative. In the 1950s and 
1960s, early development economists postulated a desirable per capita growth rate and calculated 
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the “investment requirement” to meet this target: the distance between the low domestic saving 
rate and the “investment requirement” was termed the “Financing Gap”. The purpose of aid was 
to cover the Financing Gap (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966). Accordingly, this model 
predicted a strong growth effect for foreign aid through its role in boosting domestic investment 
above what domestic savings would finance. Although this model soon went out of favor in the 
academic literature on development, it remained interesting in international organizations like 
the World Bank. Current policies advocating for the promotion of foreign aid to Africa have 
explicitly cited this model (Devarajan et al., 2002 at the World Bank; Blair Commission on 
Africa, 2005; Sachs, 2005).  Sach (2005, p. 1) argues: “success in ending the poverty trap will be 
much easier than it appears”. He foretells that an increase in foreign aid and debt relief can end 
Africa’s poverty in our generation. In a closed economy, savings depend not only on the distance 
from subsistence but also on the incentive to save depending on the rate of return to saving and 
investment. In an open economy, investment is not only a function of domestic saving but also 
depends on the rate of return to investment. As shown by Collier et al., (2001), Africa’s 
extensive capital flight is estimated at 39%. Thus, this large chunk of Africa’s capital stock is 
held outside the continent because domestic investors compare the returns to domestic and 
foreign investments before investment decisions. More so bank lenders will invest in the 
economy if returns are attractive enough. In the Solow model, a strong relationship between 
income and savings rates could generate multiple equilibria at low and high levels of capital 
stock, resurfacing the possibility of a poverty trap. Again, the low domestic savings would not be 
a qualm in an open economy in which investment responds to incentives.  Kraay & Raddatz 
(2005) have shown that the relationship between initial capital and saving must follow an S-
 12 
shaped curve to generate a poverty-trap; however they fail to find evidence for this shape in the 
data.  
 The second mechanism on poverty is some kind of nonconvexity of the production 
function in the Solow model. There could be strong external economies to investment or there 
maybe high fixed costs to investment projects such that a minimum threshold must be surpassed 
for investment to be productive. This notion was part of the inspiration for the original article 
that first proposed a ‘Big Push’ (Rosentein-Rodan, 1943). This strand has had a longer shelf-life 
in the academic literature than the “Financing Gap” model because theorists have a great zeal in 
models with multiple equilibira (Murphy et al., 1989). In emphasizing such nonconvexities, Sach 
(2005) suggests that Africa is in a poverty trap. ‘Big Push’ models predict strong effects of aid 
on investment and growth (development). This prediction has been the subject of a vast 
empirical literature which this paper has already detailed above (see Table 1). As we shall 
discuss in the last strand below, critics of these mechanisms (Boone, 1996, Masud & Yontcheva, 
2005) believe that the effect of aid ought not to be measured by macroeconomic indicators like 
investment (and GDP growth), but by socio-economic indicators that reflect the direct impact of 
aid in terms of improvements in social services and consumption by the poor.  
 In the second strand, we discuss policy measures on education and health.  Another view 
of Africa’s poverty has been that, it results from low human capital (poor health and education) 
and infrastructure. This emphasis which began in the 1960s is still a major theme in explaining 
Africa’s poverty. While enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality of education is hampered 
by missing inputs like textbooks and other school material, weak incentives for teachers, 
corruption in education bureaucracies and disruption of schooling by political crisis (Filmer & 
Pritchett, 1997).  In health, some of the initial progress has slowed, possibly due to corruption in 
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the health system (studies in Cameroon, Guinea, Uganda and Tanzania estimated that 30 to 70% 
of government drugs disappeared before reaching patients).  Also, there are more complicated 
health problems that cannot be solved with routine methods (Filmer et al., 2000; Pritchett & 
Woolcock, 2004).  
 The third strand highlights growth models. The structural adjustment program is another 
view of why Africa remains poor. It gained prominence in the early 1980s with the advent of the 
“Washington consensus” and the ‘pro-free market’ arguments from personalities like the World 
Bank chief economist Anne Krueger. According to this view, Africa is poor because its 
governments have chosen bad policies. Indeed, it is obvious that many African governments 
pursued policies very destructive of growth and economic development: artificially overvalued 
currencies, high black market premiums on foreign exchange, controls on interest rates that led 
to negative real interest rates for savers, drastic restrictions on international trade and reliance on 
state enterprise. This ‘bad policies’ view of Africa’s poverty led to a different perception of the 
role of aid. The role of Western donors and international institutions within this framework was 
to induce changes in African macroeconomic policies by making aid conditional on such 
changes. Structural adjustment loans of the IMF and the World Bank were therefore embodied in 
this approach: which had as objective an “adjustment with growth”.  How successful were these 
loans in facilitating “adjustment”; that is to say: changing policy? How successful was 
development assistance in inducing better policies? The answer has been consistently that, 
Western donors and international institutions were not very successful in changing policy 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2002; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Van de Walle, 2001; Easterly, 2005b). 
However answers from these studies are based on old data (1970-2000). The current paper uses 
updated data to find new answers.   
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 In the fourth strand on ‘aid, institutions and development’, a large literature on 
institutions and development suggests that Africa is poor because it has poor institutions: 
dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract enforcement, violence and political 
instability, hostile regulatory environment for private business and high inflation. In a bid to end 
African poverty, according to this view the West needs to promote good institutions. Svensson 
(2000) finds that aid increases corruption in ethnically fractionalized countries (which is the 
situation of most African states). Knack (2001) discovers that higher aid worsens bureaucratic 
quality, leads to violating the law with increasing impunity and more corruption (controlling for 
potential reverse causality). Similarly, Djankov et al. (2005) find that high aid caused setbacks to 
democracy between 1960-1999. Indeed they found aid’s effect on democracy to be worse than 
that of the “natural resource curse”.  
 The fifth strand presents some evidence on dysfunctional donors. According to Easterly 
(2005a), while all the attention in the aid and development debate is focused on Africa, it is also 
interesting to assess how effective donors have been at delivering valuable services to Africa. 
There have been alarming signs of donor dysfunction. A case in point is the over 2 billion US 
dollars spent on roads in Tanzania over the last 20 years. Yet roads have not improved. Even by 
bureaucratic standards, foreign aid bureaucracy is dire. Why? Perhaps it is because efforts and 
results in aid are largely unobservable and noticed only by the voiceless poor. Thus, the lack of 
results visibility makes aid bureaucracies unaccountable. Unlike private firms or democratic 
governments in rich countries, aid agencies do not face a “voter test” or “a market test”. Africa’s 
poor could be conceived as political orphans; with no voice or feedback on whether aid is 
helping them and nobody accountable to them.  
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 In the sixth strand, it is interesting to discuss the shift in focus of aid from development to 
more poverty reducing initiatives like the MDGs. Consistent with Masud & Yontcheva (2005, p. 
5-6), there was a change in strategic motivations of aid donors in the late 1990s. As suggested by 
Boone (1996), one of the reasons advanced for the disappointing results of most aid oriented 
studies is that GDP growth is not the right measure of aid effectiveness. Accordingly, aid could 
be increasing consumption rather than investment (which would explain the disappointing results 
of studies on growth) and still mitigate poverty via either ‘higher consumption of the poor or 
greater provision of services to the poor”.  In light of these developments (on studies that 
measured the impact of aid on social indicators instead of macroeconomic variables), the avowed 
objectives of the donor community evolved from industrialization programs to poverty reduction 
initiatives, reflected by the adoption of the MDGs. Many of the targets of these MDGs first 
discussed at international conferences and summits held during the 1990s were later compiled 
and became known as the International Development Goals. In September 2000, member states 
of the United Nations unanimously adopted the Millennium Declaration and the General 
Assembly acknowledged the MDGs as part of the road map for implementing the Millennium 
Declaration.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
 
Borrowing from Clement et al. (2004), aggregate aid  could be divided into three 
categories: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid (likely not to be positively correlated with 
growth in the short-tem)
9
; (2) aid that affects growth only over the long-term (if at all); such as 
aid to support democracy, the environment, health or education; and (3) aid that plausibly could 
                         
9
 “Funding for a new road  might affect economic activity in short order, funding for a vaccination campaign might 
only affect growth decades later, and humanitarian assistance may never affect growth” (Clements et al., 2004, p. 4).  
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stimulate growth in the long-term, including budget and balance of payments support, 
investments in infrastructure and aid for productive sectors such as agricultural and industrial. 
While studies on aid effectiveness implicitly define donors’ objective as solely the promotion of 
economic growth or the reduction of poverty in the recipient countries, a parallel strand of the 
literature on aid allocation has shown that most donors often pursue a different underlying 
agenda: allocating aid according to their own strategic interest. Masud & Yontcheva (2005) have 
pointed-out that if a significant part of aid is allocated for strategic purposes, no positive impact 
in terms of growth or poverty alleviation should be expected. We partially refute this claim by 
asserting that, foreign aid irrespective of vested donor-interest should contribute to development 
or economic deterioration (even in marginal terms) either directly or indirectly. This is 
essentially because strategic foreign aid could be assimilated to foreign direct investment that 
also has strategic business interests. Accordingly, even if the strategic foreign aid was to end-up 
in the pockets of corrupt officials, it may still be laundered and reinvested in the domestic 
economy.  
 We examine a panel of 52 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB). Details of summary statistics (Appendix 1), 
correlation analysis (Appendix 2), variable definitions (Appendix 3) and presentation of 
countries (Appendix 4) are found in the appendices. In a bid to obtain results with more updated 
policy implications, the dataset spans from 1996 to 2010. Dependent variables include: GDP 
growth, GDP per capita growth and IHDI, while independent variables are dynamics of Net 
Official Development Assistance (NODA). For robustness purposes we use three measures of 
NODA: total NODA, NODA from Multilateral donors and NODA from the Development 
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Assistance Committee (DAC) countries
10
. In the regressions we control for population growth 
rate, regulation quality, democracy and public investment. The choice of control variables is 
constrained by the degrees of freedom necessary for overidentifying restrictions tests at second-
stage regressions (more than two control variables will result in exact or under-identification; 
meaning instruments are either equal to or less than the number of endogenous explaining 
variables respectively). Instrumental variables are: income-levels, religious-dominations and 
legal-origins. These instruments have been largely documented in the economic development 
literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011). The choice of the instruments is 
also consistent with recent African human development (Asongu, 2013c), institutions (Asongu, 
2012a) and finance (Asongu, 2012c) literature. Religion has been documented as a significant 
determinant of foreign aid (Nelson, 1988). From intuition, high-income countries are less prone 
to aid than their middle- and low-income counterparts.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 The methodological underpinning largely borrowed from Beck et al. (2003) is typically 
consistent with recent African human development (Asongu, 2013c), institutions (Asongu, 
2012a) and finance (Asongu, 2012c) literature. Accordingly, we first regress the foreign aid 
indicators on the instrumental variables and then save the fitted values that are subsequently used 
as regressors in the main (second-stage) equation of the Instrumental Variable (IV) empirical 
strategy. The intuitions motivating the choice of the instrumental variables are the following. (1) 
Economic prosperity (in terms of income-levels) affects aid decisions since it is normal to expect 
                         
10
 Multilateral donors are international organizations such the World Bank that provide development assistance. 
They also act as an agency for channeling funds between donor countries and recipient countries. There are 24 DAC 
members. They include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
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that aid might be higher in low-income countries. (2) The colonial heritage in terms of legal 
origins also influences how former colonial powers allocate aid to poorer countries. Accordingly, 
it should be expected that more aid would be allocated to former colonies in view of preserving 
some strategic interests. (3) Few would object to the view that faith matters in foreign aid 
allocation decisions. This position has been empirically confirmed by recent literature on the 
‘Muslim-ness’ of aid recipients: oil, immigration and terrorism (Loud et al., 2008).  
 
3.2.1 Endogeneity  
 
 While development assistance has a bearing on the development of the recipient country 
(Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006), the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out as aid from 
donor agencies (countries) is conditional on development (institutional) characteristics of 
recipient countries. Such factors maybe environmental (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001), supply-
shocks (Collier & Dehn, 2001) or even effective policies and economic management standards 
(Burnside & Dollar, 2000). We are thus faced with an issue of endogeneity owing to reverse-
causality and omitted variables, since the NODA indicators are correlated with the error term in 
the equation of interest. To address this issue we shall confirm the presence of endogeneity with 
the Hausman-test and employ an estimation technique that takes account of the endogeneity 
issue.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
In accordance with Beck et al. (2003) and recent African law-finance literature (Asongu, 
2011) the paper adopts an IV estimation method. IV estimation addresses the puzzle of 
endogeneity and thus avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main 
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equation. In line with Asongu (2011), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) estimation method 
adopted by this study will entail the following steps. 
 
First-stage regression:  
 
 iit nlegalorigiNODA )(10  ireligion)(2 ilincomeleve )(3  ititi vX          (1)             
                               
                                                                  
Second-stage regression: 
 
 itit NODAGrowth )(10   itiX   it                                                              (2)                                                                                        
 
 NODA stands for Net Official Development Assistance (Total NODA, NODA from 
Multilateral donors and NODA from DAC countries). Instrumental variables are legal-origins, 
dominant-religions and income-levels. Growth stands for economic prosperity (at aggregate and 
per capita levels) and human development. In Eq. (1), the NODA dynamics are regressed on the 
instruments and the fitted values are used as regressors in the second-stage regressions (Eq. 2). In 
the two equations, X is a set of control variables. For the first and second equations,  v  and u, 
respectively denote the disturbance terms. 1 , 2 , 3  are the respective effects of  legal origin, 
religious domination and income-levels on NODA, while i  is the incidence of the control 
variables on NODA.  1  and  i  represent the impact of NODA and the control variables  on 
development dynamics respectively.  
We adopt the following steps in the analysis:  
 
-justify the choice of a TSLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for 
endogeneity; 
- show that the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables 
(aid channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables); 
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-ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with 
an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. 
 
3.2.3 Robustness checks 
 
To ensure robustness in the analysis, the following checks will be carried-out: (1) usage 
of alternative indicators of aid; (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable sets of moment 
conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) usage of alternative indicators 
of growth and development; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity and; (5) regressions 
under both restricted and unrestricted hypotheses.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
 This section addresses the ability of the exogenous components of NODA dynamics to 
account for differences in human development, GDP growth and GDP per capita growth; the 
ability of the instruments to explain variations in the endogenous components of NODA 
dynamics and the possibility of the instruments to account for growth and human development 
beyond NODA dynamic channels. To make these assessments, we use the panel TSLS-IV 
estimation method with legal-origins, income-levels, and religious-dominations as instrumental 
variables.  
 
4.1 Development assistance and instruments  
 
 Table 2 below assesses the validity of the instruments in explaining cross-country 
differences in NODA dynamics.  
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Table 2: First-stage regressions 
  Net Official Development Assistance (NODA) 
  NODAgdp NODAMDgdp  NODADACgdp 
  1
st
 Set 2
nd
 Set  1
st
 Set 2
nd
 Set  1
st
 Set 2
nd
 Set  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instruments  
Constant 3.675* -1.244 1.835** -1.237* 1.794 0.007 
 (1.889) (-0.740) (2.271) (-1.771) (1.381) (0.006)) 
English   1.009 --- 0.677 --- 0.294 --- 
 (0.928)  (1.500)  (0.405)  
French  --- -1.009 --- -0.677 --- -0.294 
  (-0.928)  (-1.500)  (-0.405) 
Christianity 2.084* --- 0.081 --- 2.051*** --- 
 (1.901)  (0.178)  (2.801)  
Islam  --- -2.084* --- -0.081 --- -2.051*** 
  (-1.901)  (-0.178)  (-2.801) 
L.Income --- 8.014*** --- 3.831*** --- 4.132*** 
  (6.102)  (7.022)  (4.710) 
M. Income -9.093*** --- -4.112*** --- -4.924*** --- 
 (-6.051)  (-6.587)  (-4.905)  
LMIncome 1.079 --- 0.281 --- 0.792 --- 
 (0.674)  (0.422)  (0.740)  
UMIncome --- -1.079 --- -0.281 --- -0.792 
  (-0.674)  (-0.422)  (-0.740) 
 
 
Control 
Variables  
Popg 3.342*** 3.342*** 1.559*** 1.559*** 1.755*** 1.755*** 
 (5.784) (5.784) (6.496) (6.496) (4.548) (4.548) 
Regulation  -2.377*** -2.377*** -0.739** -0.739** -1.625*** -1.625*** 
 (-2.811) (-2.811) (-2.106) (-2.106) (-2.877) (-2.877) 
        
Adjusted R² 0.257 0.257 0.285 0.285 0.193 0.193 
Fisher Statistics 32.845*** 32.845*** 37.627*** 37.627*** 22.922*** 22.922*** 
Observations 551 551 551 551 551 551 
L: Low. LM: Lower Middle. UM: Upper Middle. Ivt: Investment. Pop: population. *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA from DAC 
countries on GDP.  Student statistics ratios in brackets. 1st Set: First Set of Instruments. 2nd Set: Second Set of Instruments. 
 
Clearly, it could be observed that distinguishing African countries by legal-origins, 
income levels and religious-dominations help explain cross-country differences in NODA. Based 
on the Fisher-test, the instruments taken together enter significantly in all regressions at the 1% 
significance level.  Broadly the following findings could be established. (1) Christian-dominant 
countries have received more aid than their Islam-oriented counterparts. (2) Consistent with 
common sense and economic theory, Low-income countries are prone to more aid than Middle-
income countries. The control variables are significant with the right signs as development aid 
increases with population growth and decreases with improvement in regulation quality (which 
ensures better management and distribution of national wealth).  
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4.2 Human development, growth and development assistance  
 
Table 3 investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of the NODA channels to account for 
development dynamics and, (2) the possibility of the instrumental variables explaining 
development dynamics beyond NODA channels.  Whereas we address the first issue by 
assessing the significance of estimated coefficients, the second is investigated with the Cragg-
Donald and Sargan-OIR tests for instrument strength and validity respectively. The null 
hypothesis of the Sargan test is the view that the instruments account for development dynamics 
only through NODA channels. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection of the view 
that the instruments explain development dynamics through no other mechanisms than NODA 
channels. The null hypothesis of Cragg-Donald test is the stance that the instruments are weak; 
thus its rejection points to the strength of the instruments at first-stage regressions.   The 
Hausman-test for endogeneity precedes the IV regressions and thus justifies the choice of the 
estimation technique. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that OLS estimates are 
efficient and consistent. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the issue of reverse 
causality (endogeneity) we have elucidated earlier (see Section 3.2.1) and hence lends credit to 
the choice of a TSLS-IV estimation technique. Otherwise we model by OLS. For robustness 
purposes, results are replicated using an alternative set of instrumental variables, as shown 
towards the end of Table 3. In the unrestricted regressions of Table 3, the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman-test is rejected for all the regressions; confirming the presence of endogeneity and 
hence the choice of the TSLS-IV approach. 
With regard to the first concern which is addressed by the significance of estimated 
coefficients, it can firmly be established that NODA dynamics significantly decrease 
development and growth in Africa. The negative effect is most in aid from Multilateral donors 
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and more in aid from DAC countries. These results are broadly consistent with the aid-
development literature on developing countries (Boone, 1996; Reichel, 1995; Ghura, 1995; 
Pedersen, 1996).  
 
Table 3: Unrestricted Two Stage Least Squares  
 Human  Development GDP growth GDP per capita growth 
          
Constant  5.530 5.295 5.663 -1.832 -1.822 -1.906 -2.214 -2.208 -2.326 
 (1.294) (1.269) (1.294) (-0.537) (-0.535) (-0.555) (-0.712) (-0.715) (-0.734) 
NODAgdp  -0.172** --- --- -0.105*  --- -0.170*** ---  
 (-2.036)   (-1.862)   (-3.305)   
NODAMDgdp  --- -0.423** --- --- -0.234* --- --- -0.378***  
  (-2.062)   (-1.829)   (-3.251)  
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.289** ---  -0.188* --- --- -0.305*** 
   (-1.989)   (-1.852)   (-3.255) 
Democracy  1.217*** 1.218*** 1.219*** 0.023 0.041 0.013 0.080 0.109 0.063 
 (4.845) (4.871) (4.801) (0.107) (0.193) (0.060) (0.405) (0.566) (0.313) 
Public Investment -0.780 -0.755 -0.797 1.000** 0.980** 1.019** 0.788** 0.756* 0.819** 
 (-1.350) (-1.326) (-1.354) (2.343) (2.299) (2.371) (2.025) (1.953) (2.064) 
          
Hausman-test 35.241*** 35.115*** 35.398*** 14.624*** 15.384*** 13.638*** 19.129*** 18.691*** 19.98*** 
OIR-Sargan test 1.286 1.231 1.361 0.042 0.212 0.000 0.186 0.789 0.002 
P-value [0.256] [0.267] [0.243 ] [0.836] [0.644] [0.994 ]  [0.665 ] [0.789] [0.959 ] 
Cragg-Donald 3.020 3.016 2.983 3.719 3.645 3.780 3.719 3.645 3.780 
Adjusted R² 0.052 0.053 0.050 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.014 
Fisher Statistics 10.827*** 10.957*** 10.567*** 3.723** 3.718** 3.652** 6.581*** 6.529*** 6.338*** 
Observations 447 447 447 584 584 584 584 584 584 
First-Set of Instruments  Constant; English; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income  
Second-Set of Instruments  Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics. []: p-values corresponding to OIR-Sargan test.  OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions test.  NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: 
NODA from DAC countries on GDP.   
 
As concerns the second-issue, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR test in all 
regressions indicates that the instruments do not explain development dynamics through other 
mechanisms beyond NODA channels. Thus the instruments are valid and not correlated with the 
error term in the main equation; the instruments do not suffer-from endogeneity. The control 
variables are significant with the right signs since democracy and public investment improve 
growth and human development. The analysis in Table 3 is replicated with the second-set of 
instruments for robustness in the results. 
 Table 4 below presents restricted TSLS results. First and foremost, the results for the 
Hausman-test confirm the choice of our estimation approach. Results of the Cragg-Donald and 
Sargan-OIR tests confirm the strength and validity of the instruments respectively. While the 
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null hypothesis for weak instrument is rejected (the relative bias is probably less than 5% since 
the critical value for TSLS bias over OLS is 9.53), the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan-OIR 
test is rejected. Broadly, findings based on restricted regressions confirm those in Table 3 even 
after they are replicated with an alternative set of instruments. In substance, both the endogenous 
regressors and control variables are significant with the right signs.  
 Consistent with Andrés & Asongu (2013), the models are comparable because they have 
the same specifications. Hence, it will be interesting to also discuss differences in the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients. The negative incidence of NODA is highest for aid from 
Multilateral donors, followed by aid from DAC countries. This finding is consistent across 
development dynamics and specifications (restricted or unrestricted). Two explanations could be 
provided for these differences in magnitude. Firstly, the weight of ‘negative aid effects’ over 
‘positive aid effects’ is highest in development assistance from Multilateral donors, followed by 
aid from DAC countries and tailed by total NODA. Secondly, development assistance that 
transits through multilateral agencies may go through a lot of bureaucracy (with the increased 
risks of corruption and delay in timely execution) that entail substantial administrative costs 
which ultimately reduced its intended positive effects.  
 The conventional diagnostic tests have been taken into account because the estimation 
procedure has used: (1) a correlation analysis to mitigate multicolinearity and overparametisation 
issues; (2) a Hausman test to assess evidence of endogeneity; (3) Cragg-Donald and Sargan OIR 
tests to assess instrument strength and validity respectively and; (4) restricted and unrestricted 
modeling hypotheses.  
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Table 4: Restricted Two Stage Least Squares 
 Human  Development GDP growth GDP per capita growth 
          
NODAgdp  -0.107 --- --- -0.116** --- --- -0.184*** --- --- 
 (-1.589)   (-2.348)   (-4.041)   
NODAMDgdp  --- -0.274* --- --- -0.260** --- --- -0.410*** --- 
  (-1.645)   (-2.323)   (-3.993)  
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.175 --- --- -0.208** --- --- -0.329*** 
   (-1.535)   (-2.329)   (-3.974) 
Democracy  1.118*** 1.119*** 1.119*** -0.010 0.009 -0.022 0.040 0.071 0.020 
 (4.714) (4.754) (4.688) (-0.051) (0.049) (-0.110) (0.221) (0.402) (0.110) 
Public Investment -0.056 -0.056 -0.059 0.779*** 0.759*** 0.790*** 0.520*** 0.488*** 0.538*** 
 (-0.391) (-0.394) (-0.409) (7.223) (7.441) (7.035) (5.263) (5.229) (5.173) 
          
Hausman-test 59.718*** 60.848*** 58.845*** 46.555*** 47.966*** 45.426*** 22.303*** 21.634*** 22.657*** 
OIR-Sargan test 3.009 2.889 3.111 0.369 0.557 0.345 0.765 1.425 0.600 
P-value [0.222] [0.235] [0.211] [0.831] [0.756] [0.841] [0.682] [0.490] [0.740] 
Cragg-Donald 15.651** 15.643** 15.289** 17.469** 17.788** 16.785** 17.469** 17.788** 16.785** 
Adjusted R² 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.013 
Fisher Statistics 16.329*** 16.557*** 16.082*** 86.000*** 86.947*** 84.351*** 27.897*** 28.126*** 26.800*** 
Observations 447 447 447 584 584 584 584 584 584 
First-Set of Instruments  Constant; English; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income  
Second-Set of Instruments  Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income 
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (): z-statistics . []: p-values corresponding to OIR-Sargan test.  OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions test. For the Cragg-Donald statistics the relative bias is probably less than 5% since the critical value for TSLS bias 
over OLS is 9.53. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA from DAC 
countries on GDP.   
 
 
4.3 Further discussion, caveats and policy implications  
 
 Before engaging in the discussion of the findings, it is relevant to highlight the intuition 
motivating the term ‘questionable economics’. A great chunk of development assistance is 
intended directly or indirectly to boost prosperity at overall economic or per capita income 
levels. This can be qualified as the ‘economics of development assistance’. Within the 
framework of our study, any suggestion (theoretical or empirical) to the contrary of the intuition 
can also logically be termed ‘questionable economics’.  
 Findings in this paper do not provide grounds for the hope that Western aid can save 
Africa. Perhaps current views on the roots of poverty in Africa are too simplistic and attempts to 
change these root causes have underestimated the difficulty of doing so from the outside. The 
failure of the West’s attempted rescue through aid does not necessarily imply a disastrous 
outlook for Africa. Africans on their own will have to achieve economic and political changes 
that promote African economic development and some of these changes are already on course 
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(such as the movement towards freer markets and the expansion of democracy). There are 
therefore hopeful signs of the growth of enterprise in Africa. The explosion of cell phones for 
example has enabled Africa edge the phase of fixed phones in the development process. 
Economic development in Africa depends on African private sector entrepreneurs, African civic 
activists and African political reformers… not on what ineffective, unaccountable, bureaucratic, 
poorly informed and unmotivated outsiders do.  
 So if anything, what can the West do for Africa? Just because the West cannot save 
Africa does not logically imply there is nothing the rich countries can do for the African 
continent. The evidence in the literature (Easterly, 2005a) suggests that aid has been more 
successful at delivering tangible outcomes like education, health and water. The micro 
development literature using randomized controlled trails also finds positive effects of some 
specific development interventions from foreign aid.  In a nutshell the West cannot save Africa, 
but foreign aid can still be beneficial to recipient countries in a piecemeal way to alleviate the 
sufferings of those desperately poor.  
 More modest goals from aid in Africa would make it easier to hold aid agencies 
accountable for the results of aid-targeted projects. The sweeping ambitions of the current 
Western aid efforts in Africa do not lend themselves to accountability, since (for the most part) 
the outcome depends on many other factors beside aid agency efforts and attempts to isolate the 
effects of these efforts have proved fruitless. More accountable agencies might be encouraged to 
make more progress on piecemeal interventions. These modest goals would render the West 
much less intrusive in Africa, thus ending the historical tendency towards ever-increasing 
escalation of Western interventions in the continent. This could be an appealing prospect because 
the intrusive Western role has made African governments accountable to external actors instead 
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of their own citizens. It follows that insiders have better information and incentives to solve their 
own problems than outsiders do. Arguably, local democracy that eases citizen feedback has 
proven to be a more effective vehicle for good government than outside pressure. On a final 
note, the more intrusive large-scale interventions have lots of unintended consequences that are 
hard to evaluate, many of which could be detrimental.  
The negative nexuses between foreign aid and development dynamics could also be 
traceable to how politics influences the allocation and results of aid. Accordingly, aid supplies 
are substantially conditioned on the willingness of recipients to accede to aid conditions and the 
political motivations of donor states. A political economy perspective of aid is really crucial in 
understanding our findings because intensions of aid are products of culture, institutions, power 
distribution and the dynamics of competitive interests (Schraeder et al., 1998; Hopkins, 2000). 
Aid is the outcome of bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid 
bureaucracies, multilateral aid agencies and recipient government officials. Indeed donors pursue 
multiple goals and these vary over time.  For instance, economic gains seem important in 
Japanese aid, global welfare improvement in Nordic aid and political goals in French aid. Hence, 
few would object to the inference that our findings may also be explained by a motivation of the 
French to maintain their colonial legacies and influence in Africa.  
This is evident because until the nineties, cold war concerns provided a core motivation 
for aid. Recipient states did not fail because it was in the interest of the cold war combatants that 
they did not fail since development was a secondary concern. Hence, rent-seeking elites were not 
obliged to account to donors for aid effectiveness. It is therefore not surprising that after the cold 
war, states once propped-up by strategically motivated aid are now openly failing. Some analysis 
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blame this failure on donor governments, pointing out they had undercut development results by 
giving priority to other donor state purposes, particularly political and commercial interests.  
Imperialism and neocolonialism dominated the agenda on vested donor interests. 
Accordingly, donors have sought to increase influence for each aid dollar. Except for the rapidly 
growing countries in Asia, recipients (especially African states) have moved towards offering 
more concessions to donor preferences. For instance, the ease with which Egypt resisted aid and 
policy pressures from the West in the 1960s is over. Especially in the African continent, recipient 
countries have become supplicants, trotting out a range of projects in the hope to capture aid 
(Lancaster, 1999; Hopkins, 2000). Hence, donors (especially former colonial powers) can 
bargain for more influence. They can now ask for higher policy standards for their money and 
what they demand often does not necessarily advance the economics of development assistance. 
For example, a recent decision by the British and USA governments to cut aid to certain African 
countries because of anti-gay laws explains this point in a nut shell. 
Before concluding, we devote space to discuss the caveats of the paper. Firstly, the assertion 
to refute the Masud & Yontcheva (2005) claim documented in the data section may not be 
enough. Minou & Reddy (2010) have decomposed aid into developmental assistance and non-
developmental assistance and found that the former has a positive impact on growth. However it 
should be noted that, we have only partially dismissed the Masud & Yontcheva claim.  Secondly, 
the generalization of our findings to every dimension of development assistance should be 
treated with caution. We have only provided a global macroeconomic assessment of the 
incidence of aid on development dynamics. The overall negative incidence could be the result of 
the weight of ‘negative aid effects’ on ‘positive aid effects’. Hence, the findings by no means 
indicate that foreign aid is perilous from all standpoints. For instance, we have documented 
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evidence in the literature where-by, foreign aid has been instrumental in the domains of 
education, health and infrastructure. More so, from common sense, emergency relief aid in times 
of natural disasters is logically positive. A critical dimension of this caveat is the need for 
significant income transfers from rich countries to poor countries to cope with the effects of 
global warming.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
 Past research on the African aid-growth (development) nexus has been based on data 
collected before the year 2000 and mostly focused on growth. Literature investigating the effect 
of aid on human development presents the shortcoming of using an index that is unadjusted for 
inequality. This paper has used more updated data (1996-2010) and the Inequality adjusted 
Human Development Index first published in 2010 to complement existing literature. The 
findings broadly indicate that development assistance is detrimental to GDP growth, GDP per 
capita growth and human development. Given concerns on the achievement of the MDGs, the 
relevance of these results point to the deficiency of foreign aid as a sustainable cure to poverty in 
Africa.   
Perhaps the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can 
possibly know. As Hayek (1988, p. 76) suggested “the curious task in economics is to 
demonstrate to men how little they know about what they imagine they can design”. The 
escalation of Western interventions in Africa demonstrates arrogance in the face of very 
imperfect knowledge. Once economists discard arrogance, there is hope to hold donors 
accountable for such piecemeal outcomes as well-maintained roads, medicines, water supply, 
textbooks and nutritional supplements to improve the wellbeing of the poorest people in the 
world. It is thus momentous time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is time for 
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economists and policy makers to start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is 
based. In the meantime, it is up to people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies 
accountable for results. 
Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-economic, the actual impact from 
the findings negates this. A potential solution to aid dependence is the development of alternative 
sources of finance through access to private markets or development of market-based domestic 
financial systems capable of generating resources for industrialization and long-term 
development. Caveats have been discussed.  
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
Development  
Assistance  
Net Development Assistance(NODA)  10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
NODA from Multilateral Donors    4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
NODA from DAC countries   6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
       
Growth & 
Development  
 
Human   Development  1.351 6.341 0.127 47.486 551 
GDP growth  4.822 7.351 -31.30 106.28 744 
GDP per capita growth  2.380 6.754 -33.07 90.140 753 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Population growth 2.359 1.015 -1.081 10.043 780 
Regulation Quality  -0.673 0.673 -2.729 0.905 620 
Democracy  2.307 4.089 -8.000 10.000 735 
Public Investment  7.489 4.535 0.000 39.984 641 
       
 
 
 
Instrumental 
Variables 
English Common-Law 0.384 0.486 0.000 1.000 780 
French Civil-Law  0.615 0.486 0.000 1.000 780 
Christianity  0.634 0.481 0.000 1.000 780 
Islam  0.365 0.481 0.000 1.000 780 
Low Income  0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 780 
Middle Income 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000 780 
Lower Middle Income  0.230 0.421 0.000 1.000 780 
Upper Middle Income  0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 780 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
Growth and Development Development Assistance Control Variables Instrumental Variables  
HDI GDPg GDPpcg TA MLD DAC Popg Reg Demo PubI Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI  
1.000 -0.026 -0.025 -0.072 -0.079 -0.060 -0.014 0.160 0.131 -0.151 0.185 -0.185 0.101 -0.101 -0.080 0.089 -0.081 0.231 HDI 
 1.000 0.987 0.053 0.073 0.034 0.335 0.058 0.059 0.117 -0.002 0.002 0.029 -0.029 -0.052 0.052 -0.000 0.067 GDPg 
  1.000 0.000 0.013 -0.008 0.187 0.106 0.075 0.115 0.013 -0.013 0.030 -0.030 -0.125 0.125 0.034 0.122 GDPpcg 
   1.000 0.900 0.955 0.368 -0.242 -0.031 0.195 -0.050 0.050 0.058 -0.058 0.450 -0.450 -0.265 -0.281 TA 
    1.000 0.733 0.400 -0.220 0.011 0.220 -0.035 0.035 -0.006 0.006 0.475 -0.475 -0.284 -0.293 MLD 
     1.000 0.304 -0.230 -0.056 0.141 -0.056 0.056 0.098 -0.098 0.382 -0.382 -0.222 -0.242 DAC 
      1.000 -0.195 -0.063 0.043 -0.107 0.107 0.008 -0.008 0.425 -0.425 -0.222 -0.296 Pog 
       1.000 0.519 0.078 0.134 -0.134 0.077 -0.077 -0.274 -0.274 0.106 0.231 Reg. 
        1.000 0.147 0.177 -0.177 0.163 -0163 -0.034 0.034 -0.162 0.228 Demo 
         1.000 -0.138 0.138 0.008 -0.008 -0.049 0.049 0.002 0.059 PubI. 
          1.000 -1.000 0.189 -0.189 -0.043 0.043 -0.057 0.115 Eng. 
           1.000 -0.189 0.189 0.043 -0.043 0.057 -0.115 Frch. 
            1.000 -1.000 -0.003 0.003 -0.153 0.167 Chris 
             1.000 0.003 -0.003 0.153 -0.167 Islam 
              1.000 -1.000 -0.639 -0.569 LI 
               1.000 0.639 0.569 MI 
                1.000 -0.267 LMI 
                 1.000 UMI 
HDI: Human Development Index.  GDPg: GDP growth. GDPpcg. GDP per capita growth.TA: Total  development assistance.  MLD: Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. DAC: Development 
Assistance Committee .  Popg: Population growth. Reg: Regulation quality. Demo: Democracy.  PubI:Public Investment.  Eng: English Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: 
Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Net Development Assistance 
(NODA)  
NODAgdp NODA (% of GDP) World Bank  (WDI) 
    
NODA from Multilateral 
Donors  
NODAMDgdp NODAMDgdp (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
NODA from DAC Donors   NODADACgdp NODADACgdp (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Human  Development   HDI Human Development Index World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP Growth  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP Per Capita Growth   GDPpcg GDP Per Capita Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation Quality  R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Average annual population growth rate  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubI Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries 
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num. 
 
Legal-origins  
English Common-Law Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles,  Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe. 
20 
   
French Civil-Law  Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, 
Congo  Democratic Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe,  Senegal, 
Togo, Tunisia. 
 
32 
    
 
 
Religions  
 
 
Christianity  
Angola, Benin ,Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic 
Republic, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sao 
Tome & Principe, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe. 
 
33 
   
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, The Gambia, Egypt, 
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Libya,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia. 
19 
    
 
 
Income Levels 
Low Income  Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,  
Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic Republic, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea,  
Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,  Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda,  Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe. 
 
30 
   
Middle Income Algeria, Angola ,Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, 
Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya,  
Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles,   
Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
22 
   
Lower Middle Income  Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, 
Morocco,  Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
11 
   
Upper Middle Income  Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,  Mauritius, 
Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa.  
10 
Num: Number of  countries   
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